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Louis Henkint
Late last spring, the editors asked Louis Henkin of Columbia
Law School whether he would contribute an essay to the Journal
as our own memorial to Alexander Bickel's work in constitutional
law. We are honored that Professor Henkin accepted our invita-
tion. Like Bickel, he was a law clerk of Justice Frankfurter, served
in the State Department in the early 1950's, and is a constitutional
scholar of the highest stature. His voice seems the best tribute to
Professor Bickel, whom we knew only in our first year of law
school and whose absence we continue to regret.
Of the many constitutional themes which Alex Bickel addressed,
few evoked from him more perceptive insights and more sophisticated
comment-or aroused more controversy-than his illumination of the
"political question" doctrine. Like others, I have had difficulties with
the doctrine, and some with Bickel's view of it. Continuing confusion
and controversy, aggravated by what the Supreme Court has done and
said since Bickel wrote, lead me to heretical questions: Is there a
"political question" doctrine? Do we need one?'
That there are political questions-issues to be resolved and deci-
sions to be made by the political branches of government and not by
the courts-is axiomatic in a system of constitutional government built
on the separation of powers. The federal courts exercise neither the
"legislative Powers" nor "The executive Power" of the United States.2
They do not tax and spend, borrow or coin money, regulate com-
merce, establish rules of naturalization or exercise any of the other
powers vested by the Constitution in -Congress; nor make treaties,
appoint officers, command the armed forces, or make other decisions
t Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law and Diplomacy, Columbia University.
1. I began to move towards these questions in an editorial comment, Henkin, Viet-
Nam in the Courts of the United States: Political Questions, 63 Am. J. INT'L L. 284
(1969), and in my book, L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 210-16 (1972).
2. Compare U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, and art. II, § I, with art. III, § 1.
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that are the President's to make. The courts exercise "The judicial
Power of the United States," deciding cases and controversies arising
under the Constitution and under the laws and treaties of the United
States-laws and treaties made by the political branches."
If, as happens, a federal court is asked to make "law" or to extend
existing law beyond the limits of proper interpretation, the courts
might say that to make such law is a political responsibility, and
whether to do so, a "political question." And indeed the courts
have used the term in that sense, to demarcate the political from
the judicial domain and judicial responsibility from that of Congress
or the Executive. They have said, for example, that their concern is
only whether the political branches of government, federal or state,
have exceeded constitutional limitations; as long as the political
branches act within their constitutional powers, whether they have
done wisely or well is a "political question" which is not for the
courts to consider.4
One needs no special doctrine to describe the ordinary respect of
the courts for the political domain. If a political question is one which
3. In addition to law-making inherent in the art of interpreting the Constitution
or the laws and treaties, federal courts make law to maintain and develop the judge-
made maritime law inherited from England, and to govern relationships between states
that come for original adjudication before the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Southern Pac.
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch
Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931); cf. West Vir-
ginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28 (1951). They sometimes make law interstitially
in other areas which are constitutionally committed to the federal government. See, e.g.,
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Friendly, In Praise of Erie-
And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383 (1964); Henkin, The
Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 805 (1964).
4. For one of many examples, see Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537-38 (1934).
Such statements imply no special doctrine of judicial abstention; in that sense there
are political questions in virtually every case, whenever a court reads and applies the
Constitution or an act of Congress.
Marshall was speaking of such political questions as early as Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803):
By the Constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain
important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion,
and is accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own
conscience.
• . . [A]nd whatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which ex-
ecutive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no power to control
that discretion. The subjects are political. They respect the nation, not individual
rights, and being entrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is
conclusive.
Id. at 165-66.
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to
enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have
a discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution
and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.
Id. at 170.
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the Constitution commits to the political branches, our political life
is full of them. The courts may sometimes have occasion to decide
whether a question was in fact constitutionally committed to the po-
litical branches, but that, too, needs no special doctrine suggesting
a quality of "nonjusticiability" with connotations that the courts must
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and authority without reaching the
merits.
A meaningful political question doctrine, in my view, implies some-
thing more and different: that some issues which prima facie and by
usual criteria would seem to be for the courts, will not be decided
by them but, extra-ordinarily, left for political decision. In particular,
I suggest, in "pure theory" a political question is one in which the
courts forego their unique and paramount function of judicial re-
view of constitutionality. As so conceived, the doctrine would have
it that although in general, in a proper case, the courts will examine
the actions of government for conformity to constitutional authori-
zations and limitations,5 some constitutional requirements are entrust-
ed exclusively and finally to the political branches of government
for "self-monitoring."6 As to these, the courts say to the petitioner
in effect: "Although you may indeed be aggrieved by an action of
government, although the action may indeed do violence to the Con-
stitution, it involves a political question which is not justiciable,
not given to us to review." In our day the political question doctrine
was invoked in lower courts to deny judicial review of constitutional
issues raised by our national misfortunes associated with Vietnam.7
Failure to maintain the distinction between the ordinary respect
of the courts for the substantive decisions of the political branches,
and extra-ordinary deference to those branches' determination that
what they have done is constitutional, has aggravated confusion and
controversy as to whether, and why, and when, such extra-ordinary
5. In theory, every action of government is subject to such judicial review but by
now, surely, the large majority of governmental actions are indubitably within constitu-
tional authority if only because the courts have long ago so held, and the availability of
judicial scrutiny is only hypothetical. In a substantial number of cases a claim of consti-
tutional infirmity is not wholly without substance, but the courts nonetheless readily
conclude that the action of the political branches was not ultra vires under the Constitu-
tion. In such cases, I stress, the courts are in no sense deferring to the political branches:
the judges are scrutinizing but "passing" what the political branches have done.
6. The Supreme Court was applying this "pure theory" of political questions when
it considered whether the issues were political questions in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962), and Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), but held they were not. See
pp. 603-04 infra.
In the Constitution of India, some provisions are declared to be "Directive Principles
of State Policy" and expressly immunized from judicial review. See INDIA Cosr. pt.
IV, art. 37.
7. See pp. 623-24 infra.
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judicial deference is called for.8 As an exception to judicial review, a
political question doctrine is surely striking and of great import.
Thanks to Marbury v. Madison,9 constitutional issues generally are
not "political" but justiciable, 10 and declaring acts of the political
branches of government unconstitutional does not, ipso facto, express
the "lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government"
which Justice Brennan found to be one basis for judicial abstention
under the political question doctrine." Judicial review is now firmly
established as a keystone of our constitutional jurisprudence. A doc-
trine that finds some issues exempt from judicial review cries for strict
and skeptical scrutiny.
The thesis I offer for discussion is that there may be no doctrine
requiring abstention from judicial review of "political questions." ' -
8. Confusion is compounded when the courts do not make it clear whether they are
denying relief out of deference for the political branches, ordinary or extra-ordinary,
or for other reasons, e.g., that the court does not have jurisdiction of the case under
applicable constitutional and statutory provisions, that a sufficient claim for relief has
not been made, or that the remedy sought is not appropriate in the circumstances.
The courts sometimes sweep into "political question" other alleged political failures and
inadequacies which the courts cannot remedy, for example, the failure by a legislature to
legislate or appropriate funds to carry out responsibilities of government.
Other references to "political" decisions, powers, interests, also do not form part of
a constitutional political question doctrine. A different doctrine denies standing to
those who assert only a "political" interest. The courts will not entertain a suit by a
state to challenge an alleged usurpation of power by the federal government where the
state's interest is only "political," its desire to maintain the constitutional compact.
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); cf. Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886
(1970). Similarly the courts, it has been assumed, would not entertain a suit by Congress
against the President alleging presidential usurpation of congressional authority. Courts
have, however, given standing to a member of Congress claiming presidential usurpation
and interference with the member's function. Compare Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d
1307, 1315 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974), and Harrington v. Schlesinger,
528 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1975), with Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Compare the Supreme Court's grant of standing to members of the state legislature in
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), with Frankfurter's dissent, id. at 460. Where
plaintiff is denied standing to raise an issue because his interest is only political, the
issue is usually justiciable if raised by a different plaintiff with a "personal" interest.
See notes 12, 39 infra.
Constitutional issues might be denied review if a necessary party is constitutionally
immune to the court's jurisdiction, e.g., members of Congress under "the speech or de-
bate clause," U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, or the President under his suggested immunity while
in office. Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867); but cf. United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
9. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
10. Justice Gibson's famous opinion in Eakin v. Raub, 12 S. & R. 330 (Pa. 1825), in
effect saw every claim that the legislature violated the Constitution as a political question;
the legislature's conclusion that it was acting within its constitutional' authority he
thought was not subject to judicial review.
11. See p. 603 infra.
12. And few, if any, discrete clauses of the Constitution are immune to review by their
own terms. Compare pp. 604-05 & note 26 infra. There may of course be failure of
judicial review for lack of case or controversy or the other grounds for "not hearing"
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The cases which are supposed to have established the political ques-
tion doctrine required no such extra-ordinary abstention from ju-
dicial review; they called only for the ordinary respect by the courts
for the political domain. Having reviewed, the Court refused to in-
validate the challenged actions because they were within the con-
stitutional authority of President or Congress. In no case did the
Court have to use the phrase "political question," and when it did,
it was using it in a different sense, saying in effect: "We have re-
viewed your claims and we find that the action complained of in-
volves a political question, and is within the powers granted by
the Constitution to the political branches. The act complained of
violates no constitutional limitation on that power, either because
the Constitution imposes no relevant limitations, or because the ac-
tion is amply within the limits prescribed. We give effect to what
the political branches have done because they had political authority
under the Constitution to do it." 13
I
Bickel wrote about "political questions" in reaction and response
to my colleague Herbert Wechsler. Wechsler had written:
[A]ll the doctrine can defensibly imply is that the courts are
called upon to judge whether the Constitution has committed to
another agency of government the autonomous determination of
the issue raised, a finding that itself requires an interpretation.
[T]he only proper judgment that may lead to an abstention from
decision is that the Constitution has committed the determination
of the issue to another agency of government than the courts.
Difficult as it may be to make that judgment wisely, whatever
factors may be rightly weighed in situations where the answer is
not clear, what is involved is in itself an act of constitutional
interpretation, to be made and judged by standards that should
govern the interpretive process generally. That, I submit, is toto
caelo different from a broad discretion to abstain or intervene. 1
4
which the Supreme Court has developed. Some clauses may be effectively immune to
judicial review because no one has standing to raise them. See note 39 infra; note 8 supra.
13. I do not find any reason to believe that the Court in these cases was eager to
dismiss as nonjusticiable, rather than to affirm, in order to avoid "legitimating" what
the political branches had done. It was perhaps otherwise with some of the lower
courts that avoided deciding issues of the Vietnam War. See pp. 623-24 infra.
14. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV.
1, 7-8, 9 (1959).
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Bickel's response was pungent:
It is different, just so; but only by means of a play on words can
the broad discretion that the courts have in fact exercised be
turned into an act of constitutional interpretation. The political-
question doctrine simply resists being domesticated in this fashion.
There is something different about it, in kind, not in degree, from
the general "interpretive process"; something greatly more flex-
ible, something of prudence, not construction and not principle.'
His own explanation of the doctrine had a very different flavor:
Such is the basis of the political-question doctrine: the court's
sense of lack of capacity, compounded in unequal parts of the
strangeness of the issue and the suspicion that it will have to
yield more often and more substantially to expediency than to
principle; the sheer momentousness of it, which unbalances judg-
ment and prevents one from subsuming the normal calculations
of probabilities; the anxiety not so much that judicial judgment
will be ignored, as that perhaps it should be but won't; finally
and in sum ("in a mature democracy"), the inner vulnerability
of an institution which is electorally irresponsible and has no
earth to draw strength from.16
Neither Wechsler nor Bickel was addressing the ordinary respect
which courts must pay to the constitutional authority of the political
branches; both, I believe, were discussing the "political question"
doctrine as a basis for extra-ordinary judicial abstention. For Wechsler
the courts had no basis for, and no business, abstaining except where
the Constitution could fairly be interpreted as requiring them to ab-
stain. And he did indeed read several constitutional provisions as,
extra-ordinarily, committing issues finally and exclusively to the politi-
cal branches, denying the courts even their usual task of scrutinizing
the actions of the political branches for alleged constitutional infirmi-
ty.' 7 Bickel was insisting that the courts were entitled to abstain, from
15. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75
HARV. L. REV. 40, 46 (1961).
16. Id. at 75. See also A. BICKEL, TiE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 172 (1962).
17. See note 26 infra. Wechsler does not, of course, exclude considerations of pru-
dence as guides to constitutional interpretation. The Framers may have acted from
"prudence," say, in making each House judge of the qualifications of its members. Or,
motivations of the Framers apart, courts may favor one interpretation over another
from considerations of prudence, including concern for the place of courts in our systeu
and their relations to the political branches. But the result is an interpretation of the
Constitution, not abstention by the courts on their own initiative from their own
institutional considerations of wisdom and policy or from ad hoc prudential concerns
of particular judges in particular circumstances.
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prudence or from "wisdom," and were to be applauded for asserting
that authority in appropriate instances.' s
In large measure, Wechsler and Bickel differed as to what the doc-
trine should be. But I think they were also exposing different im-
pressions of what the courts had wrought. As to that we have had
additional light from the Supreme Court since Wechsler and Bickel
disputed. In Baker v. Carr, Justice Brennan told us:
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly
according to the settings in which the questions arise may de-
scribe a political question, although each has one or more elements
which identify it as essentially a function of the separation of
powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve
a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitu-
tional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political depart-
ment; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking inde-
pendent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for un-
questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious -pronounce-
ments by various departments on one question.19
Professor Wechsler might seem entitled to say that Justice Brennan
largely confirms his view: "Prominent ... is . ..a textually demon-
strable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate po-
litical department .... ,,20 And in Baker v. Carr (and in more recent
18. I do not deal here with other exercises of judicial prudence which Bickel
applauded (and Professor Wechsler challenged)-for example, the Supreme Court's oc-
casional escape, by various devices, from reviewing cases which were within its juris-
diction on appeal (rather than on writ of certiorari). Cf. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891
(1955) (per curiam); Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497
(1966). Compare BICKE., supra note 16, at 71, 126, with Wechsler, supra note 14, at
34, and Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues," 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11-12
(1964). The central issue of the debate was whether the Supreme Court had such dis-
cretion to avoid review when Congress can be deemed to have denied it by placing such
cases within the Court's compulsory rather than its discretionary jurisdiction. Bickel ap-
parently thought that Congress did not mean to (and perhaps had no authority to)
deny some "inherent" power of the Court to be "prudent." Unlike those cases, the
political question doctrine is not policy for the Supreme Court; it is a doctrine of non-
justiciability requiring abstention by all courts, federal and state.
19. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
20. In turn, Bickel might note that the other considerations in Justice Brennan's
list are not rooted in any textual commitment and several of them partake of "wisdom"
and prudence. But see note 27 infra. Brennan's considerations appear as generalizations
which have afforded guidance to lower courts. Bickel did not try to "domesticate" his
prudential concerns into guidelines, and would probably support abstention whenever he
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cases)21 the Supreme Court looked into the Constitution in order to
decide whether the issues in those cases were "political," i.e., non-
justiciable, requiring extra-ordinary judicial abstention (though in
the end it interpreted the text as not denying justiciability to those
issues, and proceeded to adjudicate and resolve them). But even as
the Supreme Court was restating the doctrine and rooting it "prom-
inently" in textual interpretation, the Court was also cutting away
the principal candidates to which Professor Wechsler would apply it.
Although the Constitution provides that "Each House shall be the
Judge of the ... Qualifications of its own Members," the Court held
reviewable, and reversed, a judgment by the House that elected-Rep-
resentative Adam Clayton Powell was not qualified.2 2 Although the
same clause provides that each House "shall be the Judge of the Elec-
tions [and] Returns . . . of its own Members," the Court in Roude-
bush v. Hartke23 reviewed and upheld a state procedure providing for
a recount in an election for the United States Senate.2 4
The Supreme Court has not recently held any issue to be textually
committed by the Constitution to the other branches and therefore
not justiciable-a "political question." 25 And the Court's failure to
require judicial abstention in those instances where scripture can
most plausibly be read to require it leaves a strong sense that the
present Justices are not disposed to find many-or any-issues in fact
and the courts agreed that abstention was "wise," in the public interest most broadly
conceived.
21. See notes 22-25 infra.
22. Poi2ell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). The Court read the Constitution as
denying the House the right to impose qualifications other than those explicitly pre-
scribed in Article I, § 2, viz., age, citizenship and residence. And it was those explicit
constitutional qualifications "at most," the Court said, which were committed to each
House without review by the judiciary. Id. at 548.
23. 405 U.S. 15 (1972).
24. And while the Court found executive privilege implied in the constitutional
system, it rejected presidential claims that the scope and content of the privilege were
exclusively and finally for the President to determine, and reviewed and invalidated
Mr. Nixon's invocation of it. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). Also, although
Wechsler had read the provisions that the House "shall have the sole Power of Impeach-
ment" and the Senate "shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments" as excluding
the courts from intervention in the impeachment process (compare note 26 infra), others,
especially in the light of Powell, have read the Constitution as permitting at least
some interventions as regards some issues related to impeachment. Compare R. BERGra,
IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM (1973), with C. BLACK, IMPEACHMENT: A
HANDBOOK (1974), and the differing opinions in COMMITTEE oN FEDERAL LEcISLATION,
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACH-
MENT (1974); HOUSE CoMMe. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD
Mf. NIxoN, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. No. 1305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974); cf. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Gunther, Judicial Hegemony
and Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon Case and the Impeachment Process, 22 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 30 (1974).
25. But cf. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973); see pp. 619-21 infra.
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so textually committed. Justice Brennan, however, found textual com-
mitment to another branch "prominent" in the doctrine as estab-
lished by the older cases, and both he and Professor Bickel, trying
to make sense of the constitutional jurisprudence they had inherited,
apparently found instances of judicial abstention on grounds other
than "textual commitment.'"
If any clauses in the Constitution are properly interpreted as con-
ferring power not subject to judicial review, so be it (though there
might be too few of such bricks and it might be otherwise misleading
to build a "political question doctrine").2 6 If the cases have estab-
lished that courts must, or should, or may, abstain from judicial re-
view of constitutionality because of one or more of the considerations
distilled by Justice Brennan or from Bickel's undifferentiated "pru-
dence," so be that too (although Professor Wechsler is surely entitled
to ask where the Court found authority for such abstention). I am
not satisfied, however, that the older cases called for extra-ordinary
judicial abstention in the sense of the pure "political question doc-
trine"; the considerations distilled from them by Justice Brennan
seem rather to be elements of the ordinary respect which the courts
show to the substantive decisions of the political branches.2 7 Different
26. For Wechsler, judicial review was contemplated by the Fathers. See Ivechsler,
supra note 14, at 2-10. But since even for him judicial review is not unambiguously
explicit, it would be surprising if one found clauses in the Constitution that explicitly
and unambiguously excluded judicial review. Nevertheless, he reads various clauses as
textually barring judicial review. He would agree, I think, that they might be read
otherwise; indeed, as we have seen, in several notable instances the Court has read them
otherwise. See p. 604 supnra. For example, "Each House shall be the Judge of the
Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members." That clause does not say "sole
Judge," and one can argue that the commitment of that task to each House no more
precludes judicial review of what they do, than the commitment of the power to regulate
commerce to Congress precludes judicial review of what Congress does under that power.
Compare note 22 supra. Even the unique instance, "[t]he Senate shall have the sole Power
to try all Impeachments," does not necessarily preclude the argument that while the Senate
alone is to be the judge in impeachment proceedings, the courts can review how it
does it, at least for constitutional excesses or infirmities. See note 24 supra.
27. As I read them, neither Justice Brennan's catalogue nor the cases from which
he distills it suggest that the courts must abstain from judicial review because the
Constitution says so (Wechsler's view), or may do so from general considerations of
prudence and wisdom (as claimed by Bickel). Judging from the cases, even the "tex-
tually demonstrable commitment" of an issue to the political branches apparently does
not nccessarily mean exclusive and final commitment to the political branches without
judicial review (see pp. 608, 611-12 infra), but only the kind of commitment found,
say, in the grants to Congress in Article I, § 8; the courts consider daily whether the
political branches exercise power textually committed to them with due respect for con-
stitutional limitations or prohibitions.
The other considerations cited seem also to be particularizations of how the courts
exercise their ordinary deference for the political dofiain. Only "unusual need for un-
questioning adherence to a political decision already made" canh perhaps be read to imply
that from prudential reasons (like those cited by Bickel) the courts should not consider
even the constitutionality of such a decision. But that interpretation of what Justice
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(perhaps only clearer) opinions might have been written in the leading
cases that would justify and explain their result without even using
the words "political question," and without suggesting a doctrine
that would also be deemed to support an exception to our commit-
ment to judicial review.
The Court, I suggest, was following (or might have followed) one
of several established jurisprudential lines which are sometimes con-
fused with the "political question doctrine" but which essentially
have nothing to do with it:
1. The act complained of was within the power conferred upon
the political branches of the federal government by the Constitution,
and their action was law binding on the courts.
2. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the act complained of fell
within the enumerated powers conferred upon the political branches
by the Constitution (or within the inherent powers of the state) and
was not prohibited to them explicitly or by any warranted inference
from the Constitution; nor did it violate any right reserved to the
petitioner by the Constitution.
3. Although a legal claim existed, indeed although a constitutional
violation may have been committed, the remedy sought was an equi-
table remedy and would not be granted in the circumstances by a
court of equity in the exercise of sound discretion.
The first two are commonplace: courts have held one or the other
of these in innumerable cases. In such cases, I stress, the court does
not refuse judicial review; it exercises it. It is not dismissing the
case or the issue as nonjusticiable; it adjudicates it. It is not refusing
to pass on the power of the political branches; it passes upon it, only
to affirm that they had the power which had been challenged and
that nothing in the Constitution prohibited the particular exercise
of it.
Denial of a particular, or any, equitable remedy is also not an ex-
ception to judicial review. The court may indeed review, find a vio-
lation, and still deny the remedy; or it may deny some remedy, say,
an injunction, but grant other relief, e.g., a declaratory judgment.s
Brennan said is not inevitable, and I do not know of any case from which Justice
Brennan might have derived such a principle.
Baker v. Carr has become the starting point and the touchstone for all discussions of
political questions. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 517, 518-21 (1969). The
lower courts also have harked back to Justice Brennan's criteria in considering arguments
that certain issues require abstention from judicial review. See the cases cited in note
74 infra.
28. That doctrine, too, was commonplace, at least to earlier generations of judges
and lawyers. In the past, especially when equity courts were distinct and lawyers and
law students studied their jurisdiction and jurisprudence, lawyers argued and the courts
606
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II
The first and still-leading case is Luther v. Borden,29 and the'prime
example of a "political question" commonly offered is still one arising
under Article IV, § 4: "The United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government . ..."
Luther v. Borden . . . though in form simply an action for
damages for trespass was, as Daniel Webster said in opening the
argument for the defense, "an unusual case." The defendants,
admitting an otherwise tortious breaking and entering, sought to
justify their action on the ground that they were agents of the
established lawful government of Rhode Island, which State was
then under martial law to defend itself from active insurrection;
that the plaintiff was engaged in that insurrection; and that they
entered under orders to arrest the plaintiff. The case arose "out
of the unfortunate political differences which agitated the people
of Rhode Island in 1841 and 1842," 7 How., at 34, and which
had resulted in a situation wherein two groups laid competing
claims to recognition as the lawful government. The plaintiff's
right to recover depended upon which of the two groups was en-
titled to such recognition; but the lower court's refusal to receive
evidence or hear argument on that issue, its charge to the jury
that the earlier established or "charter" government was lawful,
and the verdict for the defendants, were affirmed upon appeal to
this Court. 0
The federal courts were asked and refused to reexamine the legiti-
macy of the charter government, which had been recognized by Con-
gress and the President. Referring to Article IV, Chief Justice Taney
said:
Under this article of the Constitution it rests with Congress to
decide what government is the established one in a State. For as
the United States guarantees to each State a republican govern-
ment, Congress must necessarily decide what government is estab-
lished in the State before it can determine whether it is republi-
can or not. And when the senators and representatives of a State
are admitted into the councils of the Union, the authority of
the government under which they are appointed, as well as its
republican character, is recognized by the proper constitutional
authority. And its decision is binding on every other depart-
frequently considered the appropriateness of the equitable remedy even in constitutional
cases. See pp. 617-22 infra.
29. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
30. Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186, 218-19 (1962) (Brennan, J.) (footnotes omitted).
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ment of the government and could not be questioned in a ju-
dicial tribunal.3'
Of course, the decisions of the political branches in that case were
"political," 3 2 as is every action of the political branches, but the Luther
decision gave them no extra-ordinary deference. The Court was not
refusing to scrutinize the constitutionality of what the political branch-
es had done. To the contrary, it found that the actions of Congress
and the President in this case were within their constitutional au-
thority and did not violate any prescribed limits or prohibitions. 3a
They were therefore law for the courts and there could be no basis for
any court to disregard them.34
Luther, I conclude, established no pure "political question doc-
trine." But in later, different cases, private parties attacked as un-
constitutional, because not consistent with a "Republican Form of
Government," various forms of state government, legislative delega-
tions, and new procedures for making law other than by representa-
tive legislatures, such as the referendum and the initiative. Beginning
31. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849). "So, too," added Taney, "as
relates to the clause in the above-mentioned article of the Constitution, providing for
cases of domestic violence. It rested with Congress, too, to determine upon the means
proper to be adopted to fulfil this guarantee." Id. at 42-43. By statute Congress had
authorized the President in such circumstances, on application of the state legislature or
executive, to call forth the militia. Here the President had, upon application of the
Governor of Rhode Island, recognized him as the executive power of the state, and took
measures to call out the militia to support his authority if it should be found necessary.
The state courts had previously upheld the charter government and Taney considered
that the federal courts must follow the state courts on that question of state law. Id.
at 40. That did not involve any refusal to judge the state's actions by some constitu-
tional standard; at the time, surely, there was no constitutional limitation applicable
to the states that might have been violated, as arguably there might have been after
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs did not claim that the charter
government was inconsistent with a republican form of government. See note 33 infra.
32. In reviewing this case later, Justice Brennan said:
Clearly, several factors were thought by the Court in Luther to make the ques-
tion there "political": the commitment to the other branches of the decision as to
which is the lawful state government; the unambiguous action by the President,
in recognizing the charter government as the lawful authority; the need for finality
in the executive's decision; and the lack of criteria by which a court could de-
termine which form of government was republican.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 222 (1962) (footnote omitted).
33. Petitioners did not allege that the charter government failed to satisfy the re-
quirement for a republican form of government, that the other regime was "more
republican" or that the act of Congress in recognizing it violated some other provision
of the Constitution.
34. It is said that this power in the President is dangerous to liberty, and may
be abused. All power may be abused if placed in unworthy hands -... At all
events, it is conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the United States,
and must therefore be respected and enforced in its judicial tribunals.
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) I, 44 (1849). Compare the President's authority
to recognize foreign governments, pp. 611-13 infra.
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in Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon,35 the Court,
citing Luther, refused to consider the constitutional claim, holding
that the clause is given exclusively to the political branches to monitor
and that the courts could not enforce it. In these cases the Court
apparently read the "guarantee clause" as including a prohibition for-
bidding the states to abandon republican forms, but a prohibition
that cannot be monitored and enforced by the courts. "The United
States shall guarantee" plausibly refers to the political branches, and
it is not implausible to read it as excluding monitoring and enforce-
ment by the courts. If so, we may have a unique constitutional clause
excluding the courts; but that hardly adds up to a "political question
doctrine."
In fact, the Pacific States reading of the guarantee clause was not
inevitable. It was not compelled by Luther; it was not what the Court
was required to say in holding as it did in Luther or in a confusion of
later cases. In fact, the Court might readily have continued to include
itself in "the United States," and continued to dispose of cases, as
it had earlier, by holding that the challenged variations in the forms
of state government did not vitiate their essentially republican char-
acter.30 Or, determined not to be bothered, the Court might have
35. 223 U.S. 118 (1912). Later cases dismissed the claim on the authority of Pacific
States without discussion. Kiernan v. City of Portland, 223 U.S. 151 (1912) (attacks on
initiative and referendum); Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250 (1913) (state constitutional
amendment procedure); O'Neill v. Learner, 239 U.S. 244 (1915) (delegation to court to
form drainage districts); Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916) (sub-
mission of legislation to referendum); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S.
219, 234-35 (1917) (challenge to workmen's compensation system); Ohio ex rel. Bryant
v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74, 79-80 (1930) (concurrence of all but one
justice of state high court required to invalidate statute); Highland Farms Dairy, Inc.
v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937) (delegation of legislative powers).
36. Before Pacific States, the Court had treated several claims under the guarantee
clause as justiciable, though deciding against the claim in each case. Attorney Gen. ex
rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233, 239 (1905) (legislative creation and alteration of school
districts "compatible" with a republican form of government); Forsyth v. City of Ham-
mond, 166 U.S. 506, 519 (1897) (delegation of power to court to determine municipal
boundaries does not infringe republican form of government); Minor v. Happersett, 88
U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 175-76 (1875) (denial of suffrage to women no violation of republican
form of government). In Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937),
the Court held that the delegation in question did not violate the republican form of
government requirement; nonjusticiability was an alternative ground.
The only discussion of the nonjusticiability of state violations of the guarantee clause
is Chief Justice White's in Pacific States. He treated the attack on the "initiative" in
Oregon's constitution as challenging the whole of the state government. The challenge,
he said, was to the state as a state and the courts obviously could not consider it, or
execute a judgment that "the state" was illegal. See note 39 infra. He might have con-
sidered it an attack on the particular procedure only, and invalidating it would have
no "inconceivable" consequences. Cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). In any
event, it would not necessarily follow that a challenge to some specific new procedure,
where invalidation would not have serious consequences, would also be nonjusticiable,
but the later cases simply invoked the authority of Pacific States without discussion. The
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read Article IV to say that the responsibility cast upon "the United
States" to guarantee to every state a republican form of government
does not necessarily imply a power, even in the political branches,
to impose a republican form of government on a state that wished
to deviate from it37 Or, granting the power of Congress to impose
republican government on deviant states, the grant to Congress im-
plies no "self-executing" prohibition upon the states.38 Or, that any
prohibition implied in Article IV does not bring with it a private
right to be governed only by republican institutions, and to enjoin
the operations of deviant state government or to challenge the validity
of their particular acts on that gTound.39 None of these reasons would
amount to extra-ordinary deference either to state government or to
the political branches of the federal government. They would not ex-
ceptionally deny judicial review of constitutionality. They would deny
relief because the claims assert no cause of action under the Con-
stitution, because there is no constitutional prohibition to enforce
or no constitutional right to vindicate.
The foreign relations of the United States have provided a second
group of leading cases commonly cited as instances of judicial absten-
Court, rightly, never gave the objections serious consideration, but it might as easily
have rejected the claims on the merits as it had done earlier.
37. While the records of the Convention are inconclusive, Randolph, at least, ap-
parently sought a clause that would prohibit state deviations from republican government.
1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 206 (Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937);
2 id. at 48; 4 id. at 49. The language eventually adopted, however, was not his but,
essentially, Wilson's. 2 id. at 48-49. Madison, in the Federalist Papers, implies that the
federal government would have "authority to defend the system against aristocratic or
monarchical innovations." THE FEDERALIST No. 43. Hamilton suggests that a guarantee
of republican government "could only operate against changes to be effected by vio-
lence." "It could be no impediment to reforms of the State constitutions by a majority
of the people in a legal and peaceable mode." THE FEDERALIST No. 21.
38. Compare the views of Chief Justice Taney in the License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.)
504, 573 (1847), and of Justice Black in Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761,
784 (1945), that the grant to Congress of the commerce power implied no self-executing
prohibitions forbidding the states to regulate commerce. This suggestion is related to
the judicial abstention of the political question doctrine only because, in general, courts
might be less willing to find a constitutional prohibition when they are reluctant to
monitor it. Compare also Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861), holding
that the obligation of a state to extradite a fugitive to a sister state cannot be ju-
dicially enforced.
The Court -might have said also that, even reading Article IV as forbidding the state"
to deviate from republican government, the definition of republican government was
left to Congress and the courts will enforce the prohibition only after Congress defined
and prescribed its content.
39. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). Compare other clauses in the Constitution
which can probably not be vindicated by private action because no one may have
standing; e.g., the prohibition of titles of nobility, or the "statement and account"
clause, U.S. CONsT. art. I, §§ 9, 10. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179
(1974); cf. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13 (1972). Standing to assert that Congress is
exceeding its spending power, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, is also hard to come by.
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tion because the issues were political.40 In several cases the Court con-
sidered itself bound by the Executive's determination that a particular
regime was the government of a foreign state; that given territory
belonged to a foreign state; that an island belonged to the United
States; that certain aliens should be deported.
Consider what the Court said:
And can there be any doubt, that when the executive branch
of government, which is charged with our foreign relations, shall
in its correspondence with a foreign nation assume a fact in re-
gard to the sovereignty of any island or country, it is conclusive
on the judicial department? And in this view it is not material
to inquire, nor is it the province of the Court to determine,
whether the executive be right or wrong. It is enough to know,
that in the exercise of his constitutional functions, he has decided
the question. Having done this under the responsibilities which
belong to him, it is obligatory on the people and government of
the Union.41
Or:
Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is not
a judicial, but a political question, the determination of which by
the legislative and executive departments of any government con-
clusively binds the judges .... 42
But even if courts could require full disclosure, the very nature
of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial.
Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the
political departments of the government, Executive and Legisla-
tive. They are delicate, complex and involve large elements of
prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those di-
rectly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or
imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary
has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has
United States v. Richardson, supra; Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Ex parte Levitt,
302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
In some cases at least, and surely in the days before declaratory judgments, the courts
might have held that enforcing a republican form of government might require re-
structuring a state government in ways beyond the capacity of a court of equity. See
p. 622 infra. Compare Taney's opinion in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 41-43
(1849). In Pacific States, Chief Justice White emphasized that the assault in the case
was "not on the tax as a tax but on the state as a state," and stressed the far-reaching im-
plications of exercising judicial power to vindicate a republican form of government in
that case. 223 U.S. at 141-42, 150.
40. I draw here on previous writings, cited in note I supra.
41. Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839).
42. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890).
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long been held to belong in the domain of political power not
subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.'13
Also:
It is pertinent to observe that any policy toward aliens is vi-
tally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies
in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and
the maintenance of a republican form of government. Such mat-
ters are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of gov-
ernment as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or in-
terference. 44
None of those cases, I conclude, involved abstention from judicial
review, or other extra-ordinary deference to the President. 45 In none
of them did the Court refuse to consider whether the President had
exceeded his constitutional authority; rather, it concluded that the
President's decision was within his authority and therefore law for
the courts. The Court was not asserting that the President's determi-
nations were binding on the courts "right or wrong," constitutional
or unconstitutional. Recognizing a particular regime as the govern-
ment of a foreign country, accepting the sovereignty of a foreign
country over given territory, or claiming sovereignty for the United
States are neither findings of fact nor legal conclusions (which a court
might review) but political positions taken by the President on behalf
of the United States, and his to take under the Constitution.46 If the
Court sometimes spoke of the special quality of foreign relations and
the need for the nation to speak with one voice, it did so not to sup-
port extra-ordinary judicial abstention but to explain the generous
43. Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
44. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952).
45. Justice Brennan apparently recognized that the foreign relations cases did not
involve extra-ordinary judicial abstention. See, e.g., 369 U.S. at 211 n.31, where he
cites an example of "sweeping statements to the effect that all questions touching
foreign relations are political questions." The example reads: "'The conduct of the
foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive
and Legislative-"the political"-Departments of the Government, and the propriety of
what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial
inquiry or decision,'" quoting Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
But if, as is probable, "propriety" in Oetjen did not mean constitutionality, the state-
ment is unexceptionable and commonplace: so long as the political branches are acting
within their constitutional powers, "wisdom," "desirability," "propriety," are not for
the courts to review. See note 4 supra.
46. On other matters, too, the President has been recognized as having "legislative"
authority in foreign affairs, binding on the courts. See, e.g., Republic of Mexico v.
Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); Ex parte Rep'ublic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943);
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937);
cf. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913). See generally L. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 56.65.
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grant of constitutional powers to the President or Congress. 47
The boldest expressions of judicial avoidance of political questions
(not, I note, articulation of a "political question doctrine") were by
Justices not speaking for a majority of the Court. In Coleman v.
Mliller 4 8 members of the Kansas legislature brought an action to in-
validate the state's ratification of the Child Labor Amendment. Among
other things the Supreme Court held that "how long a proposed
amendment to the Federal Constitution remained open to ratification,
and what effect a prior rejection had on a subsequent ratification,
were committed to congressional resolution and involved criteria of
decision that necessarily escaped the judicial grasp. ' 40
Nothing in that conclusion suggests that in the Court's view ac-
ceptance of the Kansas ratification by Congress might be a violation
of the Constitution which the courts could not or were free not to re-
view. The Court did not say or imply that the "textual commitment"
of the amendment process to Congress was "exclusive," or in any way
different from other grants of power to Congress which the courts
have freely scrutinized for alleged constitutional usurpations. The
Court was saying only that the Constitution left the amendment
process to Congress to regulate, and, its specific requirements apart,
placed no limitations on the amendment process or on Congress's con-
trol of it. Congress having imposed no limitations, there are none,
constitutional or otherwise, and the courts had no basis for imposing
any.
A concurring opinion by Justice Black (joined by Justices Roberts,
Frankfurter, and Douglas) had a very different flavor:
To the extent that the Court's opinion in the present case even
impliedly assumes a power to make judicial interpretation of the
exclusive constitutional authority of Congress over submission and
ratification of amendments, we are unable to agree.
47. L. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 213-14 & corresponding notes at 450-53.
48. 207 U.S. 433 (1939). Coleman v. Miller is included in every catalogue of political
questions, although for Justice Brennan the elements in various formulations of the
doctrine "identify it as essentially a function of the separation of powers." 369 U.S. at
217. Presumably he reads the issues in Coleman as involving separation between Su-
preme Court and Congress as regards the amending process, U.S. CONST. art. V.
49. Justice Brennan's summary in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 214 (1962). Another
issue was whether in view of the constitutional requirement of ratification by "the
legislature" of the state, ratification was effective if the Lieutenant Governor cast the
deciding vote in the state legislature. The Court was equally divided (how is a mystery,
since nine Justices apparently participated in the case) as to whether "this contention
presents a justiciable controversy, or a question which is political in its nature and
hence not justiciable ...... Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 447 (1939). There was
also an issue as to whether state legislators had standing to bring the suit. Id. at 437-46;
see note 8 supra.
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The state court below assumed jurisdiction to determine wheth-
er the proper procedure is being followed between submission
and final adoption. However, it is apparent that judicial review
of or pronouncements upon a supposed limitation of a "reason-
able time" within which Congress may accept ratification; as to
whether duly authorized state officials have proceeded properly
in ratifying or voting for ratification; or whether a State may
reverse its action once taken upon a proposed amendment; and
kindred questions, are all consistent only with an ultimate con-
trol over the amending process in the courts. And this must in-
evitably embarrass the course of amendment by subjecting to
judicial interference matters that we believe were intrusted by
the Constitution solely to the political branch of government.
... And it is not made clear that only Congress has constitu-
tional power to determine if there is any such implication in
Article V of the Constitution. On the other hand, the Court's
opinion declares that Congress has the exclusive power to decide
the "political questions" of whether a State whose legislature has
once acted upon a proposed amendment may subsequently reverse
its position, and whether, in the circumstances of such a case as
this, an amendment is dead because an "unreasonable" time has
elapsed. No such division between the political and judicial
branches of the government is made by Article V which grants
power over the amending of the Constitution to Congress alone.
Undivided control of that process has been given by the Article
exclusively and completely to Congress. The process itself is "po-
litical" in its entirety, from submission until an amendment be-
comes part of the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial
guidance, control or interference at any point.
... Congress has sole and complete control over the amending
process, subject to no judicial review . . . 0
These Justices indeed were asserting an authentic political question,
though why they read the grant of power to Congress in Article V
differently from other grants to Congress is not obvious. It was not
the position of the majority.
Finally, until Baker v. Carr held otherwise, an example commonly
cited as a political question was "legislative malapportionment," with
Justice Frankfurter the principal expositor of the doctrine. Colegrove
v. Green5' involved a suit to restrain Illinois elections for Congress
because the congressional district in which plaintiffs resided was much
larger in population than other districts in Illinois. The lower court
dismissed the suit and the Supreme Court affirmed. In his noted
50. 307 U.S. at 458-59.
51. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
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opinion (for a minority of the Court), Frankfurter said several dif-
ferent things:
We are of opinion that the appellants ask of this Court what
is beyond its competence to grant. This is one of those demands
on judicial power which cannot be met by verbal fencing about
"jurisdiction." It must be resolved by considerations on the basis
of which this Court, from time to time, has refused to intervene
in controversies. It has refused to do so because due regard for
the effective working of our Government revealed this issue to
be of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet for
judicial determination.52
The short of it is that the Constitution has conferred upon Con-
gress exclusive authority to secure fair representation by the States
in the popular House and left to that House determination wheth-
er States have fulfilled their responsibility. If Congress failed in
exercising its powers, whereby standards of fairness are offended,
the remedy ultimately lies with the people. Whether Congress
faithfully discharges its duty or not, the subject has been com-
mitted to the exclusive control of Congress. An aspect of gov-
ernment from which the judiciary, in view of what is involved,
has been excluded by the clear intention of the Constitution
cannot be entered by the federal courts because Congress may
have been in default in exacting from States obedience to its
mandate.
...Yet, Congress has at times been heedless of this command
and not apportioned according to the requirements of the Census.
It never occurred to anyone that this Court could issue man-
damus to compel Congress to perform its mandatory duty to ap-
portion. "What might not be done directly by mandamus, could
not be attained indirectly by injunction." ...
To sustain this action would cut very deep into the very being
of Congress. Courts ought not to enter this political thicket. The
remedy for unfairness in districting is to secure State legislatures
that will apportion properly, or to invoke the ample powers of
Congress. The Constitution has many commands that are not en-
forceable by courts because they clearly fall outside the conditions
and purposes that circumscribe judicial action .... The Constitu-
tion has left the performance of many duties in our governmental
scheme to depend on the fidelity of the executive and legislative
action and, ultimately, on the vigilance of the people in exercising
their political rights.53
52. Id. at 552.
53. Id. at 554-56. Among other things, Frankfurter seemed to identify his position
with dismissal for "want of equity," but he thought that a court could not issue a
declaratory judgment if it could not issue an injunction. Id. at 551-52. Justice Rutledge
treated Frankfurter's position otherwise. See p. 619 infra.
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Frankfurter can be read, as he has been, as saying that constitutional
objections to malapportionment are not justiciable. But he seems also
to be saying something else that would support the result, even his
principal thesis, without establishing an exception to judicial review.
He was saying that Congress has power under the Constitution to regu-
late the manner of electing representatives, and Congress had done
so, both affirmatively as well as by accepting what the state legisla-
tures had done; that what Congress had done or accepted did not
violate any constitutional limitation or prohibition. In particular it
did not violate any constitutional rights of the petitioners. "The basis
of the suit is not a private wrong, but a wrong suffered by Illinois
as a polity. '5 4
That strand in Frankfurter's thesis became even clearer in his dis-
sent in Baker v. Carr, and in Justice Harlan's dissent in Baker which
Frankfurter joined. In that case plaintiffs had argued that mal-
apportionment of the state legislature denied them the equal pro-
tection of the laws because the weight of their vote was not equal
to that of voters in less populous districts. Surely one reason why
Frankfurter thought the complaint should be dismissed was that it did
not state a cause of action: the Constitution did not give the plain-
tiffs the right they alleged; the equal protection clause was not vio-
lated because it does not require "one-man one-vote."
The notion that representation proportioned to the geographic
spread of population is so universally accepted as a necessary ele-
ment of equality between man and man that it must be taken to
be the standard of a political equality preserved by the Fourteenth
Amendment-that it is, in appellants' words, "the basic principle
of representative government"-is, to put it bluntly, not true.
However desirable and however desired by some among the great
political thinkers and framers of our government, it has never
been generally practiced, today or in the past.5
Harlan's opinion makes it wholly clear:
Once one cuts through the thicket of discussion devoted to
"jurisdiction," "standing," "j usticiability," and "political ques-
tion," there emerges a straightforward issue which, in my view, is
determinative of this case. Does the complaint disclose a violation
of a federal constitutional right...? [I]n my opinion, appellants'
allegations, accepting all of them as true, do not, parsed down or
54. 328 U.S. at 552.
55. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 301 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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as a whole, show an infringement by Tennessee of any rights as-
sured by the Fourteenth Amendment ...
. . . Until it is first decided . . . whether what Tennessee has
done or failed to do in this instance runs afoul of any such [con-
stitutional] limitation we need not reach the issues of "justici-
ability" or "political question" .. . ..
The suggestion of my Brother FRANKFURTER that courts lack
standards by which to decide such cases as this, is relevant not
only to the question of "justiciability," but also, and perhaps
more fundamentally, to the determination whether any cognizable
constitutional claim has been asserted in this case. Courts are un-
able to decide when it is that an apportionment originally valid
becomes void because the factors entering into such a decision are
basically matters appropriate only for legislative judgment. And so
long as there exists a possible rational legislative policy for re-
taining an existing apportionment, such a legislative decision can-
not be said to breach the bulwark against arbitrariness and caprice
that the Fourteenth Amendment affords.57
By the time the battle was joined (and lost) even those who op-
posed judicial intervention in reapportionment insisted less that the
constitutional claims were not justiciable than that they were without
merit.
III
The leading cases of the past were or could have been decided, I
believe, without foreswearing judicial review or indulging other extra-
ordinary self-effacement by the courts, whether from principle or pru-
dence. Yet, like Professor Bickel, I do not exclude that wisdom might
sometimes advise the courts to stay their hand. They can usually do
that where necessary, I believe, within the context of judicial review,
by invoking established principles permitting a court to withhold
relief for "want of equity."
Equitable principles and considerations are absorbed into consti-
tutional jurisprudence whenever a court is asked for an equitable
remedy in a constitutional case, and in numerous and various cases
federal courts have refused a remedy on grounds historically avail-
able to a court of equity."s Such grounds cannot be confined in black
56. Id. at 330-31.
57. Id. at 337.
58. The Supreme Court has invoked the special principles and considerations gov-
erning the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts in a variety of contexts. E.g., Stainback
v. Mo Hock Ke Lek Po, 336 U.S. 368, 383 (1949); SEC v. U.S. Realty & Improvement
Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940); Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515,
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 85: 597, 1976
letters, but they have been given form, if not codified, by centuries
of chancellors, courts of equity, and their courts of appeals, and the
Supreme Court has supervised lower federal courts in applying them.
When federal courts deny a remedy for want of equity, they do not
declare an issue nonjusticiable, whether on textual or prudential
grounds; they make no extra-ordinary exception to judicial review.
Rather they review, and they may even declare invalid, though they
deny all or some equitable remedies.
The confusion of "nonjusticiability" with "want of equity" is not
limited to our subject,59 but it has additional significance here. For
while the jurisdiction of the federal courts derives from and is defined
by Constitution and statute, their exercise of equity powers where
federal jurisdiction exists has long and deep roots, and is in their own
control unless Congress is moved to regulate it.°° The equity practice
of the federal courts has largely retained its historic scope, its historic
exceptions, and its tradition of broad discretion and flexibility, leaving
large room for "wisdom" and "prudence."6' 1 There is no reason why
these should not include considerations of federalism or the separa-
549-53 (1937). Among these cases were several which implicated constitutional rights.
E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S.
192, 200 (1973) (Burger, C.J.).
59. Compare the confusion between lack of jurisdiction, or of federal jurisdiction,
and want of equity. See 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACtICE f 2.08, at 406 (2d ed. 1975).
Among the considerations in Justice Brennan's list in Baker v. Car', p. 603 supra,
several seem more persuasive as reasons to deny an equitable remedy, or a par-
ticular equitable remedy, than to support a finding of nonjusticiability: "T]he im-
possibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unques-
tioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of em-
barrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question."
60. Doctrines denying, limiting, or deferring injunctions and other equitable relief
in various circumstances were developed by the courts, though some were later codified
and others added by Congress. Compare, for example, the history of injunctions against
collection of taxes, or against state judicial proceedings, and the doctrine of federal
abstention. Congress limited the use of injunctions in labor disputes, and their use
against state utility rates. See generally 2 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACrICE jj 2.08 (2d ed. 1975).
61. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that an appeal to an equity court
is an appeal to the exercise of the sound discretion which guides the determination
of courts of equity. E.g., Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176, 182 (1935) ("[T]he
sound discretion which is the controlling guide of judicial action in every phase of a
suit in equity"); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941) ('The
history of equity jurisdiction is the history of regard for public consequences in em-
ploying the extraordinary remedy of the injunction. There have been as many and a,
variegated applications of this supple principle as the situations that have brought it
into play."); cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Justice Frankfurter explicitly
spoke of considerations of "wisdom" in the exercise of that discretion. Stefanelli v.
Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951) ("[T]o sustain the claim would disregard the power
of courts of equity to exercise discretion when, in a matter of equity jurisdiction, the
balance is against the wisdom of using their power.")
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tion of powers, 2 of institutional integrity and the inter-institutional
harmony implied in the nature of judicial power and the character of
judicial institutions in their relation to political power and political
institutions.
The difference between "want of equity" and "political question"
is explicitly invoked by Justice Rutledge in his opinion in Colegrove
v. Green. 3 Pointedly, he did not join Frankfurter's opinion that the
issues in the case were not justiciable:
Assuming that [Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355] is to stand, I
think, with Mr. Justice Black, that its effect is to rule that this
Court has power to afford relief in a case of this type as against
the objection that the issues are not justiciable.
In the later case of Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1, the Court dis-
posed of the cause on the ground that the 1929 Reapportionment
Act ... did not carry forward the requirements of the 1911 Act
... and declined to decide whether there was equity in the bill.
... But, as the Court's opinion notes, four justices thought the
bill should be dismissed for want of equity.
In my judgment this complaint should be dismissed for the
same reason. Assuming that the controversy is justiciable, I think
the cause is of so delicate a character, in view of the considera-
tions above noted, that the jurisdiction should be exercised only
in the most compelling circumstances.
I think, therefore, the case is one in which the Court may
properly, and should, decline to exercise its jurisdiction. Accord-
ingly, the judgment should be affirmed and I join in that dis-
position of the cause.64
It was something closer to denying an equitable remedy, than to
abstaining from judicial review and dismissing for nonjusticiability,
that the Supreme Court may have been (and should have been) about
in the only recent case that smacks of "political question." In Gilligan
62. There are numerous references to "public interest" as a guide in the application
of equitable principles. Federalism is explicitly respected in Pullman and Younger.
63. 328 U.S. 549, 564 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 565-66. In footnotes Justice Rutledge amplified:
Want of equity jurisdiction does not go to the power of a court in the same
manner as want of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Thus, want of equity
jurisdiction may be waived.
Id. at 565 n.2.
"The power of a court of equity to act is a discretionary one. ..
Id. at 566 n.3. The Supreme Court in effect adopted Rutledge's rationale in South v.
Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 277 (1950) ("Federal courts consistently refuse to exercise their
equity powers in cases posing political issues arising from a state's geographical distri-
bution of electoral strength among its political subdivisions.") See Baker v. Car, 869
U.S. 186, 203-04 (1962).
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v. Morgan," plaintiffs, students at Kent State University in Ohio,
asked the federal district court to enjoin the Governor from pre-
maturely calling the National Guard in civil disorders and to re-
strain leaders of the National Guard from future violations of the
students' constitutional rights. They also alleged that the training,
weaponry, and orders of the National Guard required, or made in-
evitable, the use of lethal force in suppressing civilian disorders even
in circumstances when such force was excessive, and asked the district
court to establish standards and exercise continuing judicial sur-
veillance to control the National Guard in the future.
The Supreme Court held that the district court properly dismissed
the suit. The Court said:
The relief sought by respondents, requiring initial judicial re-
view and continuing surveillance by a federal court over training,
weaponry, and orders of the Guard, would therefore embrace
critical areas of responsibility vested by the Constitution in the
Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government.
... It would be inappropriate for a district judge to undertake
this responsibility in the unlikely event that he possessed requisite
technical competence to do so.06
65. 413 U.S. 1 (1973). The Court made "political question" noises also in O'Brien
v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972). The credentials committee of the Democratic National Com-
mittee had recommended seating certain delegations as representing Illinois and Cali-
fornia, and the excluded delegations challenged the Committee's actions in federal
court. The district court dismissed, the court of appeals reversed, and the Supreme
Court by a vote of 6-3 stayed the latter's decision. In the course of its brief opinion
the majority cited Luther v. Borden and stated: "No case is cited to us in which any
federal court has undertaken to interject itself into the deliberative processes of a na-
tional political convention." 409 U.S. at 4. The Court continued:
In light of the availability of the convention as a forum to review the recomi-
mendations of the Credentials Committee, in which process the complaining parties
might obtain the relief they have sought from the federal courts, the lack of prece-
dent to support the extraordinary relief granted by the Court of Appeals, and the
large public interest in allowing the political process to function free from judicial
supervision, we conclude the judgments of the Court of Appeals must be stayed.
Id. at 5. The case did not raise substantive constitutional questions, does not suggest
abstention from judicial review, and was a likely occasion for the court to talk of federal
equity powers.
66. 413 U.S. at 7-8. The Court, however, went to pains to bring this conclusion within
the political question doctrine under the criteria of Baker v. Carr. It noted that a
dissenting opinion in the court of appeals "correctly read Baker v. Carr," when it said:
"I believe that the congressional and executive authority to prescribe and regulate
the training and weaponry of the National Guard, as set forth above, clearly pre-
cludes any form of judicial regulation of the same matters. . . .Any such relief,
whether it prescribed standards of training and weaponry or simply ordered coni-
pliance with the standards set by Congress and/or the Executive, would necessarily
draw the courts into a nonjusticiable political question, over which we have no
jurisdiction."
413 U.S. at 8-9 (emphasis added in Supreme Court opinion).
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As in many such cases, the Cotirt's reason for denying relief is not
clear. The Court might be saying that even if the training and weapons
prescribed by Congress and the Executive are constitutionally inade-
quate, the courts cannot review the lapse and hence can give no relief.
If so, the Court does not tell us how it reached that conclusion; surely,
there is nothing in the clauses committing training to Congress that
implies immunity from judicial review, any more than in any other
clauses conferring authority on Congress. The Court might be saying
that the training of the National Guard is the responsibility of the
political branches, that they have exercised that responsibility, and
that what they did violates no constitutional limitation or prohibitions.
But the suggestion that courts should not even order compliance with
the standards set by the political branches67 could only be justified,
I think, on the ground that the remedy was inappropriate for an
equity court:
Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental
activity in which the courts have less competence. The complex,
subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training,
equipping, and control of a military force are essentially profes-
sional military judgment, subject always to civilian control of the
Legislative and Executive Branches.s
I am suggesting that while there may be no basis for finding an
issue nonjusticiable, there are traditional reasons why a court might
67. The plaintiffs asked, among other things, "[c]ontinued judicial surveillance to as-
sure compliance with the changed standards" that had been adopted by the Ohio
National Guard after the Kent State incident. Id. at 6; see also id. at 11 n.15. The
Supreme Court denied relief. See note 66 supra.
68. Id. at 10 (emphasis in original). The Court might have been thinking of the
limits on its equity powers in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972). Plaintiffs sought
declaratory and injunctive relief claiming violation of their constitutional rights by the
Army's alleged system of surveillance of lawful and peaceful civilian political activities.
The district court dismissed, the court of appeals reversed and was reversed in turn by
the Supreme Court. The principal ground for dismissing the suit was that even ac-
cepting the allegations, no constitutional right of the plaintiff had in fact been violated.
But the Court added:
Stripped to its essentials, what respondents appear to be seeking is a broad-scale
investigation, conducted by themselves as private parties armed with the subpoena
power of a federal district court and the power of cross-examination, to probe into
the Army's intelligence-gathering activities, with the district court determining at
the conclusion of that investigation the extent to which those activities may or may
not be appropriate to the Army's mission....
Carried to its logical end, this approach would have the federal courts as vir-
tually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action; such
a role is appropriate for the Congress acting through its committees and the
"power of the purse"; it is not the role of the judiciary, absent actual present or
immediately threatened injury resulting from unlawful governmental action.
Id. at 14-15.
The Yale Law Journal
refuse a remedy. The difference is not only or principally conceptual
or academic. To deny a remedy on equitable grounds does not carve
an exception in Marbury v. Madison for which there is no basis in
constitutional text or in anything else relevant to constitutional in-
terpretation. The traditional grounds for denying an equitable remedy
are few and narrow and not frequently present. And the reasons for
denying some remedy in some circumstances may not apply to deny
any remedy in any circumstance. In particular, the courts may be able
to render a declaratory judgment even when there are "equity rea-
sons" for refusing an injunction. So, in Powell v. McCormack, 9 the
Supreme Court said:
We need express no opinion about the appropriateness of co-
ercive relief in this case, for petitioners sought a declaratory judg-
ment, a form of relief the District Court could have issued. The
Declaratory Judgment Act .... provides that a district court may
"declare the rights . . . of any interested party . . . whether or
not further relief is or could be sought." The availability of
declaratory relief depends on whether there is a live dispute
between the parties . . . and a request for declaratory relief may
be considered independently of whether other forms of relief
are appropriate.7 0
IV
The "political question" doctrine, I conclude, is an unnecessary,
deceptive packaging of several established doctrines that has misled
lawyers and courts to find in it things that were never put there and
make it far more than the sum of its parts. Its authentic contents
have general jurisprudential validity, and nothing but confusion is
gained by giving them special handling in selected cases. I see its
proper content as consisting of the following propositions:
1. The courts are bound to accept decisions by the political branch-
es within their constitutional authority.
2. The courts will not find limitations or prohibitions on the
powers of the political branches where the Constitution does not
prescribe any.
3. Not all constitutional limitations or prohibitions imply rights
and standing to object in favor of private parties.
4. The courts may refuse some (or all) remedies for want of equity.
5. In principle, finally, there might be constitutional provisions
69. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
70. Id. at 517-18. But cf. Justice Frankfurter's position, note 53 supra.
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which can properly be interpreted as wholly or in part "self-monitor-
ing" and not the subject of judicial review. (But the only one the
courts have found is the "guarantee clause" as applied to challenges
to state action, and even that interpretation was not inevitable.)71
This alternative jurisprudence is offered not, or not only, for the
sake of elegentia iuris, or the precision of analysis that is implied in
our constitutional jurisprudence. 72 The propositions I derive from
the cases would have substantive consequences less drastic in impor-
tant respects than those flowing from the political question doc-
trine as the lower courts have read and applied it. In particular,
these propositions do not include any basis for refusing to consider,
in a category of cases uncertain in rationale and definition, an al-
legation that the political branches have acted unconstitutionally.
A constitutional exception to judicial review can perhaps be found
in some unique provision ("The United States shall guarantee"). But
judicial prudence can be supported in some circumstances by other
doctrines and better reasons.
These distinctions, I suggest, would have prevented the unhappy
confusion in the courts when attempts were made to adjudicate the
constitutionality of the Vietnam War. In a number of cases, plaintiffs
raised two principal issues. One was whether the actions of the United
States in Vietnam violated international law, in particular the treaty
obligations assumed in the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the UN Charter.
The courts properly refused to consider that question because it was
immaterial, and would not control disposition of the case: the Con-
stitution does not prohibit the political branches, acting within their
powers, from disregarding treaties or other obligations of interna-
tional law.73 Plaintiffs also claimed that the President had exceeded
his constitutional powers by engaging in a war not declared by Con-
gress; several courts held that the political question doctrine required
or permitted them not to decide that issue,74 doubtless from a pru-
71. Of course courts will not carry out responsibilities assigned to the Congress or
the President, nor mandamus them to do so.
72. Cf. Henkin, Some Reflections on Current Constitutional Controversy, 109 U. PA.
L. REv. 637, 660-62 (1961).
73. L. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 214.
74. The constitutionality of the war in Vietnam was challenged in more than 70
reported cases. See Sugarman, Judicial Decisions Concerning the Constitutionality of
United States Military Activity in Indo-China: A Bibliography of Court Decisions, 13
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 470 (1974). Most of them were dismissed either for lack of
standing or for nonjusticiability as a political question, but some reached the merits
and rejected the constitutional objection. Compare Mora v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 862
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 934 (1967), and Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D.
Pa. 1972), aff'd without opinion sub nom. Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973),
with Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971), and
The Yale Law Journal
dence that would have warmed Alex Bickel's heart, although lie
thought the Vietnam War unconstitutional and opposed it on po-
litical and moral grounds.
Bickel might have agreed that the courts were wise and prudent
not to step into a major national crisis where the President might
feel compelled not to heed the courts; or perhaps the courts had rea-
son to be anxious, "not so much that judicial judgment will be ig-
nored, as that perhaps it should be, but won't."'' 5 But I find nothing
in the Supreme Court's political question doctrine to cite in support
of that forbearance. Claims that the President had usurped congres-
sional authority, or Congress the President's, were heard and adjudi-
cated in several major cases in our history without a suggestion that
the courts are barred by some political question doctrine. 0 I see no
reason why the usurpation alleged in these cases should, exceptionally,
have been exempt from judicial review. Under the general proposi-
tions I have cited, the cases were justiciable. In cases satisfying the
requirements of case or controversy, standing, ripeness, and other ac-
cepted conditions for adjudication, the courts would have interpreted
what Congress had delegated or authorized, and explored the Presi-
dent's own constitutional authority.'7 They would have decided sep-
arately whether there were equitable reasons for denying any injunc-
tion; and if they deemed an injunction "unwise" for an equity court
in the circumstances, they would have decided whether they might
issue a declaratory judgment.
V
Of course, there are "political questions"-responsibilities lodged in
the political branches-and whether and how these responsibilities are
exercised is ordinarily not subject to review by the courts. The Con-
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
The Supreme Court regularly denied certiorari, but in the Atlee case, holding various
issues political and nonjusticiable, the judgment was affirmed on appeal without opinion.
It is debatable whether that affirmance constitutes Supreme Court approval of the
grounds for dismissal.
75. Bickel, supra note 15, at 75.
76. Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); Kendall v. United States
ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838); see also United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 128 (1871); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867); Fleming v. Page, 50
U.S. (9 How.) 603 (1850); Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814); cf.
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299
U.S. 5 (1936).
77. My own conclusion was, contrary to Bickel's, that Congress had authorized the
war and that the Tonkin Gulf Resolution did not involve an unconstitutional dele-
gation. Henkin, supra note 1, at 80-81, 100-02.
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stitution has not made them ombudsmen for all legislative inadequa-
cies in all seasons, and they cannot supply an effective remedy for
all ills. These limitations on the judicial role do not depend on some
extra-ordinary doctrine requiring the courts to abstain in some spe-
cial package of cases.
The political question doctrine saw its heyday in the New Deal
Court, and received its highest measure of devotion from Justice
Frankfurter, perhaps its boldest articulation by Justice Black in Cole-
man v. Miller." It was perhaps an expression of a wider, deeper mood
by Justices appointed to restore judicial self-restraint and allow the
elected governors to govern. The issues on which they wrote-reap-
portionment, the constitutional amendment process 79-seemed particu-
larly fitting for legislative rather than judicial rule and particularly
fitting occasions to build fences against future judicial incursions.
Since Frankfurter and Black wrote, judicial review has had a new
birth, its character and content reformed, and its place established
as a hallmark of American political life, even a birthright of every
inhabitant. I see no place in it for an exemption for uncertain "po-
litical questions." Would not the part of the courts in our system,
the institution of judicial review, and their public and intellectual
acceptance, fare better if we broke open that package, assigned its
authentic components elsewhere, and threw the package away?80
78. 307 U.S. 433, 548-59 (1939); see pp. 613-14 supra.
79. Indeed Coleman, the amendment case, involved the Child Labor Amendment
which had been made necessary by judicial activism invalidating efforts to eliminate
child labor by federal legislation. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Bailey
v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
80. "Much confusion results from the capacity of the 'political question' label to
obscure the need for case-by-case inquiry." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962).
